



Department of Defense (DoD) Joint Federated Assurance Center (JFAC) Overview

Tom Hurt

**Deputy Director, Hardware/Software Assurance
Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Systems Engineering**

**ITEA Cyber Meeting, Aberdeen, MD
February 25, 2015**



Malicious Supply Chain Risk

Threat:

- Nation-state, terrorist, criminal, or rogue developer who gains control of **systems or information** through supply chain opportunities; exploits vulnerabilities remotely, and/or degrades system behavior

Vulnerabilities:

- All systems, networks, and applications
- Intentionally implanted logic (HW/SW)
- Unintentional vulnerabilities maliciously exploited (e.g., poor quality or fragile code)
- Controlled unclassified information resident on, or transiting supply chain networks

Consequences:

- Loss of data; system corruption
- Loss of confidence in critical warfighting capability; mission impact

Access points are throughout the acquisition lifecycle...




...and across numerous supply chain entry points

- Government
- Prime, subcontractors
- Vendors, commercial parts manufacturers
- 3rd party test/certification activities



DoD SW and HW Assurance Background



Sophisticated vulnerability discovery, analysis, and remediation for Sw/Hw has been a maturing strategic imperative for DoD



Congressional Direction

403

1 Business Act (15 U.S.C. 632)) that are awarded contracts
 2 by the Department of Defense to assist such businesses
 3 to—
 4 (1) understand the gravity and scope of cyber
 5 threats;
 6 (2) develop a plan to protect intellectual prop-
 7 erty; and
 8 (3) develop a plan to protect the networks of
 9 such businesses.

10 **SEC. 937. JOINT FEDERATED CENTERS FOR TRUSTED DE-**
 11 **FENSE SYSTEMS FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF**
 12 **DEFENSE.**

13 (a) **FEDERATION REQUIRED.**—
 14 (1) **IN GENERAL.**—The Secretary of Defense
 15 shall provide for the establishment of a joint fed-
 16 eration of capabilities to—
 17 (A) the role of the federation in supporting
 18 program offices in implementing the trusted de-
 19 fense systems strategy of the Department;
 20 (B) the software and hardware assurance
 21 expertise and capabilities of the federation, in-
 22 cluding policies, standards, requirements, best
 23 practices, contracting, training, and testing;

404

1 partment and supporting policies related to software
 2 assurance and supply chain risk management.
 3 (b) **DISCHARGE OF ESTABLISHMENT.**—In providing
 4 for the establishment of the federation, the Secretary shall
 5 consider whether the purpose of the federation can be met
 6 by existing centers in the Department. If the Department
 7 determines that there are capabilities gaps that cannot be
 8 satisfied by existing centers, the Department shall devise
 9 a strategy for creating and providing resources for such
 10 capabilities to fill such gaps.

11 (c) **CHARTER.**—Not later than 180 days after the
 12 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall issue
 13 a charter for the federation. The charter shall—
 14 (1) —

15 (A) the role of the federation in supporting
 16 program offices in implementing the trusted de-
 17 fense systems strategy of the Department;
 18 (B) the software and hardware assurance
 19 expertise and capabilities of the federation, in-
 20 cluding policies, standards, requirements, best
 21 practices, contracting, training, and testing;

405

1 (C) the requirements for the discharge by
 2 the federation, in coordination with the Center
 3 for Assured Software of the National Security
 4 Agency, of a program of research and develop-
 5 ment to improve automated software code vul-
 6 nerability analysis and testing tools;

7 (D) the requirements for the federation to
 8 procure, manage, and distribute enterprise li-
 9 censes for automated software vulnerability
 10 analysis tools; and

11 (E) the requirements for the discharge by
 12 the federation, in coordination with the Defense
 13 Information Systems Agency, of a program of re-
 14 search and development to improve hardware
 15 processing, and protection tools.

16 (d) **REPORT.**—The Secretary shall submit to the con-
 17 gressional defense committees, at the time of the submittal
 18 to Congress of the budget of the President for fiscal year
 19 2016 pursuant to section 1105 of title 31, United States
 20 Code, a report on the funding and management of the fed-
 21 eration. The report shall set forth such recommendations
 22 as the Secretary considers appropriate regarding the opti-
 23 mal placement of the federation within the organizational
 24 structure of the Department, including responsibility for
 25 the funding and management of the federation.

**National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 (NDAA 2014)
 Sec. 937 Joint Federated Centers for Trusted Defense Systems for the
 Department of Defense**



NDAA 937 Approach and Status



Congress, through NDAA 2014 Section 937, directed DoD to:

“...provide for the establishment of a joint federation of capabilities to support the trusted defense system needs...to ensure security in the software and hardware developed, acquired, maintained, and used by the Department.”

Approach:

- Establish a Federation of HwA and SwA capabilities to support programs in program protection planning and execution
- Support program offices across the life cycle by identifying and facilitating access to Department SwA and HwA expertise and capabilities, policies, guidance, requirements, best practices, contracting language, training, and testing support
- Coordinate with DoD R&D for SwA & HwA
- Procure, manage, and distribute enterprise licenses for SW and HW assurance tools

Status:

- Charter under review for DepSecDef signature
- 937 Congressional Report in process and on track
- Working concept of operations, capability map, and capability gap analysis
- Initial capability on track for 2015

Implementing Section 937 through a DoD Joint Federated Assurance Center



Charter Mapping to Section 937 Language



- **Key provisions:**

- “provide for the establishment of a joint federation of capabilities to support the trusted defense system needs...to ensure security in the **software** and **hardware** developed, acquired, maintained, and used by the Department”
- “consider whether capabilities can be met by existing centers”
- “[if gaps] shall devise a strategy [for] resources [to fill such gaps]”
- “[NLT 180 days, SECDEF shall] issue a **charter**...”
- “submit to congressional defense committees...a **report** on funding and management”

- **Charter elements:**

- Role of federation in supporting program offices
- SwA and HwA expertise and capabilities of the Federation, including policies, standards, requirements, best practices contracting, training and testing
- R&D program with NSA Center for Assured Software to improve code vulnerability analysis and testing tools
- Requirements to procure, manage, and distribute enterprise licenses for analysis tools
- R&D program with DMEA to improve hardware vulnerability, testing, and protection tools

Establishes a Federation of Software and Hardware Assurance Capabilities Across DoD



JFAC Goals and Functions

- **Goals**

- Operationalize and institutionalize assurance capabilities in support of PMOs and other organizations
- Organize to better leverage the DoD, interagency, and public/private sector capabilities in hardware and software assurance
- Collaborate across the DoD to influence R&D investments in hardware and software assurance capability gaps
- Evaluate, over time, the impact of DoD investments and activities in support of assurance

- **Functions:**

- Support Program Offices and Systems across the Lifecycle
- Sustain an inventory of SwA and HwA resources across DoD
- Coordinate the R&D agenda for assurance (hardware, software, systems, services, mission) across DoD
- Procure, manage and enable access to enterprise licenses for selected automated software vulnerability analysis and other tools
- Communicate assurance expectations to the broader community



JFAC Stakeholders

- **Steering Committee**


- USD AT&L
- DoD CIO
- Department of Army
- Missile Defense Agency
- Department of Navy
- Defense Information Systems Agency
- Department of Air Force
- National Reconnaissance Office
- National Security Agency
- Defense Microelectronics Activity

- **Working Groups**

- Advisory Working Group assigned by above organizations
- Software and Hardware Working Groups consisting of key service providers

- **Coordination Activity**

Joint Federated Assurance Center



Intent is to federate existing DoD capabilities, ensure sharing of best practices, and provide visibility to programs



JFAC Objectives


- **Reduce risk and costs to programs through maturing software assurance tools, techniques and processes**
- **Assurance issue resolution through collaboration across the community (federated problem solving)**
- **Leverage commercial products and methods, and spur innovation**
- **Incorporate SwA and HwA in contracts for enhanced program protection**
- **Raise the bar on reducing defects and vulnerabilities in developed SW through SwA and HwA Standardization**
- **Heighten SwA visibility through outreach, mentoring, training and education**
- **Assess capability gaps over time and recommend plans to close**



JFAC Hardware-Focused Customer Interactions




Counterfeit, Re-cycled E-waste, Blacktopped, Potential Malicious, Clones and Substitutions





JFAC Software-Focused Customer Interactions





Summary

- **JFAC is a federation of existing capabilities**
 - To support cross-cutting needs
 - To maximize use of available resources
- **R&D is a key component of JFAC operation**
- **Innovation of SW and HW inspection, analysis, detection, assessment, and remediation tools is vital**
- **How can industry help**
 - Share assurance metrics and best practices
 - Continue to improve SW and HW assurance capability
 - Develop and maintain SW and HW assurance standards



For Additional Information



Thomas Hurt
Deputy Director, Hardware/Software Assurance,
DASD(SE)
571-372-6129 | thomas.d.hurt.civ@mail.mil



Systems Engineering: Critical to Defense Acquisition



Defense Innovation Marketplace
<http://www.defenseinnovationmarketplace.mil>

DASD, Systems Engineering
<http://www.acq.osd.mil/se>