
Threat-Based Metrics for Continuous Enterprise Network Security Management

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**To be Presented at IFIP Working Group 10.4 Workshop on
Security Assessment: Metrics and Methods
24 January 2014**




*This work is sponsored by the Department of Homeland Security under Contract FA8721-05-C-0002.
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15 Security Capabilities that Must be Managed (U.S. Department of Homeland Security)

Accounts for
People and
Services




Security
Lifecycle

Asset
S




A Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation (CDM) Process Controls Risk for Each Capability





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


One Example is Managing the Use of Unauthorized Devices on a Network






Attackers can Either Observe and Compromise Insecure Devices or Spread from Already Infected Devices





We Have Created Metrics for Nine of Fifteen Capabilities



People and Services



- 5. Trust in People
- 6. Credentials
- 7. Accounts and Privileges
- 8. Behavior and Training

Assets

- 1. Hardware
- 2. Software
- 3. Vulnerabilities
- 4. Configuration
- 9. Boundaries




Each Metric Focuses on the Most Important Attack(s) for one Capability






A Three-Stage Security Metric Maturity Model






Level 2 Capability Deficit Metrics Determine If Risk Can Be Computed Accurately

Specification



Define what is required / permitted

Coverage



Perform measurements across all entities

There are few standard aspects to the Capability Deficit metric...

Timeliness



Observe frequently enough to reliably detect a short duration security event

Test Error



Insecure states are correctly classified
(no misclassification)




Level 3 Operational Risk Metrics Estimate the Risk Based on the Observed State


Risk = Probability of Successful Attack x Impact



Compute Probability of Attack Success




Compute Attack Impact Based on Affected Devices





Existing Risk Metrics Can Not be Used in a Real-Time Diagnostic and Mitigation Loop




- **Count- and percentage-based assessments do not model attackers correctly**
 - Percentage of devices behind firewall / with anti-virus software
 - Mean / median lag of patch installation




- **Other approaches are subjective and can't be automated**
 - Annual Loss Expectancy = (Annual Rate)×(Loss)
 - Business Adjusted Risk = (Impact)×(Risk of Exploit)
 - Mission Oriented Risk and Design Analysis (MORDA)



A Count of Serious Vulnerabilities Can be Misleading



**One machine with
twenty serious
vulnerabilities**




**Twenty machines each
with one serious
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
Median Patch Lag is Difficult to Interpret

Device Patch Lag (days)





One Attack Model in LR-1 is Attackers Looking for and Compromising Insecure Unauthorized Devices



- Assume unauthorized devices are unmanaged, hence vulnerable
- Attackers observe the network to look for these devices
- Attacker may be internal or external



Defenders Continuously Search for and Process Discovered Unauthorized Devices


Authorized Device List

Subnet	IP Addr	MAC
ALAN	10.1.2.3	aa:12:bb:34:cc:56
BLAN	10.4.5.6	cc:12:bb:34:cc:54
DMZ	18.9.2.14	2d:ab:99:ff:83:83





We can Compute the Probability of Detecting a Finite Duration Event by Scanning




- The probability of detection of an event of duration w with a scan interval δ is given by

$$P_{\text{Observe}}(w, \delta) = \min\left(1, \frac{w}{\delta}\right)$$



LR-1 Capability Deficit Metric Components

Specification Deficit



$$SpecD_{subnet}(i) = 1 - I_{inventory_specified}(i)$$

Coverage Deficit



$$CovD_{subnet}(i) = 1 - I_{covered}(i)$$

Timeliness Deficit



Probability of missing an event of a specified duration W

$$TimeD(W, \{\delta_j\}, i) = \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} \left[\frac{\max(0, \delta_{j+1} - \delta_j - W)}{(m_{end} - m_{start} - W)} \right]$$

Test Error



$$TestD = P_{miss}(i)$$

given the insecure condition was observed but not recognized

Overall Capability Deficit Metric

$$CD = 1 - (1 - TimeD) \cdot (1 - CovD) \cdot (1 - TestD) \cdot (1 - SpecD)$$

The LR-1 Operational Metric Is the Asset Value of the Expected Compromised Unauthorized Devices

Sum over all unauthorized devices of the probability of each being compromised

$$OM_{Unauth} = \sum_{\text{Unauthorized Devices}} AV \cdot P(\text{Comp} | \text{Observed}) \cdot P_{\text{Observed}}$$

Compute probability of attacker observing the unauthorized device from the window of presence and attacker scan rate

$$P_{\text{Observed}}(w, \Delta) = \min\left(1, \frac{w}{\Delta}\right)$$

w = Window of time unauthorized device is present

Δ = Attacker device sampling interval

$P(\text{Comp}|\text{Observed})$ = Probability device is compromised given the it is observed by an attacker

AV = Asset Value for an unauthorized device



Summary


- **The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is implementing a Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation (CDM) strategy for protecting government networks**
- **We will be creating metrics for 15 capabilities**
- **Each metric:**
 - **Includes up to date attacker models**
 - **Estimates risk from attackers**
 - **Includes a capability deficit component to determine if risk computations are accurate**
- **We are completing descriptions for the first nine metrics**
- **These will be used by the DHS to support continuous monitoring and risk mediation**




Roadmap for the Future



Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation
(Accurate Continuous Observations,
Assess First-Step Risk,
Real-Time Operational Mitigations)



Attack Graph Analysis
(Assess Multi-Step Risk,
Prioritize and Evaluate Mitigations,
Assess Different Attackers)



Network Simulations
(Long-Term Modeling of Attacker
and Defense Strategies
and Policies)

———— Security Maturity Level —————>