



# Assessment of Network Vulnerabilities Using Virtual and Constructive Simulation

J. Harikumar, R. Hartley, and G. Pineda

January 2017

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.



## Networks are vulnerable to threats at

- system level
- network level

## Live exercises of cyber attacks and defense

- Are cost driven (time and resources)
- May conflict with other test objectives
- May create security issues
- Generally capture only the immediate effect of an event (eg., loss of communication because link was taken down)

Loss or degradation of communications is only part of the problem; *instead we require understanding a range of possible impacts*



**Provide a virtual and constructive modeling and simulation (M&S) environment**

**to assess vulnerabilities**

- **In wired and wireless networks**
- **In a mission context with varying terrains**

**to enable**

- **the “so-what” of cyber attacks**
- **“what if” analysis**
- **tactical impact analysis**
- **understanding of multi-variate network vulnerability threat vectors in a mission context**
- **analysis of cyberspace vulnerability, survivability, and lethality risks and opportunities through large-scale data analytics**



U.S. ARMY  
**RDECOM**




**ARL**

NM STATE Physical Science  
Laboratory

# Software Package



S4 simulation allows for visualization of and interaction with different scenarios involving agents interacting with each other in a mission context.





## **Open-Source Discrete Event Network Simulator**

- NSF, INRIA, GaTech, Univ. of Washington, etc.
- Development and contributions from users world-wide (C++, Python)
- Comprehensive simulation of network layers 3, 4, and above
- *Event scheduler that can be accessed and controlled externally*

**Plugin interface to Layer-3 encourages growth to the library of layer-2 models that already include CSMA, 802.11 (WiFi), etc.**

**Network emulation support for “System-in-the-Loop” and Linux tap device supporting interface to external virtualized and hardware networks**

**Support for native Linux application integration via Direct Code Execution (DCE)**



- **S4 models entities on the battlefield with respect to their network communications, movement, engagement, and sensing, and decision making associated with these areas of emphasis**
- **Network communications model in S4 enables information to be passed between entities**

**Approach taken takes advantage of**

- **S4 communications models that provide MANET routing/waveform effects (data link layer)**
- **S4 propagation models (physical layer) that can be further enhanced to provide support for EW attacks beyond basic jamming**
- **NS-3's ability to simulate nodes in either real-time or simulation modes**
- **NS-3 model fidelity at the transport and internet/network layers**
- **NS-3 support of direct code execution and the ability to connect simulation nodes to virtual and real nodes**



U.S. ARMY  
**RDECOM**

**ARL**

NM STATE Physical Science  
Laboratory

# Network Vulnerability Example: Stealing Web Traffic





U.S. ARMY  
**RDECOM**

UNCLASSIFIED

# Build the network via Sage

**ARL**

NM STATE Physical Science  
Laboratory

The screenshot shows the Sage interface with a 3D terrain map on the left. A configuration tree on the right lists various network components. A message dialog box is open, displaying the following text:

```
Message
Node 5: Put files to be served by Thttpd in /home/harkum/Files-5/var/www
```

The configuration tree includes sections for NS3 Templates, SingleHost, IpGateway, and IpGatewayRadioGhosts.

## SingleHostPassive: P1

### Config1

radio routing	RIPD
host routing	STATIC
stack type	NS3
PCAP tracing	<input type="checkbox"/>

### PktSink

### Thttpd

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> enabled	
http port	80
htdocs	/var/www
start	1.0

## SingleHostActive: P2

### Config2


radio routing	RIPD
host routing	STATIC
stack type	NS3
PCAP tracing	<input type="checkbox"/>

### Ping

### OnOff

### Wget

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> enabled	
remote	P1/0
http port	80
number of commands	100
interval between commands	5.0
path to resource	/myfiles/file.txt
relative target path	home/myfiles/gotit.txt
log file	<input type="checkbox"/>
start	2.0



**Thick Continuous** lines connect interfaces on the same subnet. They are all on the same channel. The nodes are labeled with their name and their IP address from that subnet.

**Dashed** lines connect interfaces within the same computing device. Each radio has two interfaces; each gateway radio has three.

**Thin Continuous lines** that are not bold connect interfaces in different devices. These are external wired links (pieces of Ethernet cable if you like).

**Dotted** lines connect the two radios of a gateway. This is not a signal connection, but an indication of a two-channel radio.

**Node Colors** denote members of the same IP subnet



U.S. ARMY  
**RDECOM**

# The traffic flow before the redirection:



NM STATE Physical Science Laboratory





P2: wget  
http://10.0.64.2/tmp/file.txt

P1: thttpd

No.	Time	Sender	Sender IP	Receiver	Receiver IP	Protocol	Length	Info
1	6.000113	D1	200.100.0.1:520		224.0.0.9:520	RIPv2	70	RREQ
2	7.0001444	D1	200.100.0.1:520		224.0.0.9:520	RIPv2	90	RREP:10.0.128.0/24,0.0.0.0(1...
3	7.5022232	D1	200.100.0.1:520		224.0.0.9:520	RIPv2	130	RREP:10.0.128.0/24,0.0.0.0(1...
4	8.0001142	P1	200.100.0.2:520		224.0.0.9:520	RIPv2	70	RREQ
5	8.231216599	D1	200.100.0.1	P1	200.100.0.2	ARP	64	REQUEST
6	8.456318998	P1	200.100.0.2	D1	200.100.0.1	ARP	64	REPLY
7	8.681526998	D1	200.100.0.1:520	P1	200.100.0.2:520	RIPv2	130	RREP:10.0.128.0/24,0.0.0.0(1...
8	9.000112998	P1	200.100.0.2:520		224.0.0.9:520	RIPv2	70	RREP:10.0.64.0/24,0.0.0.0(1)
9	10.502159397	D1	200.100.0.1:520		224.0.0.9:520	RIPv2	90	RREP:10.1.129.0/24,0.0.0.0(3...
10	13.166696692	P2	10.1.64.2:49155	P1/0	10.0.64.2:80	TCP	74	SYN
11	14.227337794	D1	200.100.0.1:520		224.0.0.9:520	RIPv2	110	RREP:10.1.64.0/24,0.0.0.0(3)...
12	14.777271457	P2	10.1.64.2:49156	P1/0	10.0.64.2:80	TCP	74	SYN
13	15.015397534	P1	200.100.0.2	D1	200.100.0.1	ARP	64	REQUEST
14	15.240499933	D1	200.100.0.1	P1	200.100.0.2	ARP	64	REPLY
15	15.465618333	P1/0	10.0.64.2:80	P2	10.1.64.2:49156	TCP	74	SYN,ACK
16	15.707469414	P2	10.1.64.2:49155	P1/0	10.0.64.2:80	TCP	74	SYN
17	15.936612492	P1/0	10.0.64.2:80	P2	10.1.64.2:49155	TCP	74	SYN,ACK
18	16.155030291	P2	10.1.64.2:49156	P1/0	10.0.64.2:80	TCP	70	ACK
19	16.15799837	P2	10.1.64.2:49156	P1/0	10.0.64.2:80	HTTP	193	GET HTTP/1.1 /myfiles/file.t...
20	16.38715345	P1/0	10.0.64.2:80	P2	10.1.64.2:49156	TCP	70	ACK
21	16.390147529	P1/0	10.0.64.2:80	P2	10.1.64.2:49156	HTTP	316	HTTP/1.1 200 OK abcde
22	16.40286125	P1/0	10.0.64.2:80	P2	10.1.64.2:49155	TCP	74	SYN,ACK
23	16.62000197	P2	10.1.64.2:49155	P1/0	10.0.64.2:80	TCP	70	ACK
24	16.622492049	P2	10.1.64.2:49155	P1/0	10.0.64.2:80	HTTP	193	GET HTTP/1.1 /myfiles/file.t...
25	16.851647129	P1/0	10.0.64.2:80	P2	10.1.64.2:49155	TCP	70	ACK
26	16.854311208	P1/0	10.0.64.2:80	P2	10.1.64.2:49155	HTTP	316	HTTP/1.1 200 OK abcde
27	16.887153129	P1/0	10.0.64.2:80	P2	10.1.64.2:49156	TCP	70	FIN,ACK
28	17.274000649	P2	10.1.64.2:49156	P1/0	10.0.64.2:80	TCP	70	ACK
29	17.352153129	P1/0	10.0.64.2:80	P2	10.1.64.2:49155	TCP	70	FIN,ACK
30	17.394252842	P2	10.1.64.2:49154	P1/0	10.0.64.2:80	TCP	74	SYN
31	17.570534929	P2	10.1.64.2:49156	P1/0	10.0.64.2:80	TCP	70	ACK
32	17.572971048	P2	10.1.64.2:49156	P1/0	10.0.64.2:80	TCP	70	FIN,ACK

Contents of the  
real file.txt --  
abcde



- CORE is on the NS3 network.
- Use nmap or another tool get the web server address
- Have the CORE laptop pose itself as the server using the web server address


```

root@n1: /tmp/pycore.34651/n1.conf
root@n1:/tmp/pycore.34651/n1.conf# ifconfig eth0 10.0.128.100/24
root@n1:/tmp/pycore.34651/n1.conf#
root@n1:/tmp/pycore.34651/n1.conf# ifconfig eth0:1 10.0.64.2/30

```



# Traffic flow after redirection





## Types of vulnerability assessments

- Outside looking in (web & email servers, devices accessible to internet traffic)
- Inside looking around (print servers, file servers, databases)

## Vulnerability assessment is dependent on user expertise to

- configure and monitor network and/or system resources
- patch and update services efficiently
- define and implement ways to minimize the consequences of threats

## M&S helps in vulnerability assessments

- map and assess the entire network
- examine host and radio individually
- examine security *tools* for wired & wireless networks, Windows & Linux systems

***Testing (Exploiting a vulnerability) on production resources can adversely impact the productivity of the systems and network***



U.S. ARMY  
**RDECOM**

**ARL**

NM STATE Physical Science  
Laboratory

# Backup



**Title of Paper : Assessment of Network Vulnerabilities Using Virtual and Constructive Simulation**

**Authors: Jayashree Harikumar, Roger Hartley, and George Moreno Pineda**

**Places(s) of Employment, Phone and email address (es)**

**Jayashree Harikumar**

- Physical Science Laboratory, 575-646-9464, [jharikum@psl.nmsu.edu](mailto:jharikum@psl.nmsu.edu)

**Roger Hartley**

- Physical Science Laboratory, 575-646-9485, [rhartley@psl.nmsu.edu](mailto:rhartley@psl.nmsu.edu)

**George Moreno Pineda**

- US Army Research Laboratory, 575-678-0359, [george.o.morenopineda.civ@mail.mil](mailto:george.o.morenopineda.civ@mail.mil)





Networks are vulnerable to threats at the system and network level. Traditional methods often do not capture engineering level details such as the impact of an attack on a standard routing protocol. Large scale live test of emerging technology is neither cost effective nor feasible when cyber activities can conflict with other test objectives. In this paper, we show through examples, a methodology for an analyst to configure a variety of networks using different tactical radios to integrate and understand cyber effects in an operational environment. These networks can be embedded in a credible mission scenario based on unit objectives. The proposed methodology allows an analyst to (a) configure real applications or code that is faithful to the behavior of the real application at a packet level in NS-3 nodes, (b) use Sage-Cyber simulation to get to the “so-what” of cyber-attacks in simulated or in real time, and (c) use MulVAL to assess vulnerabilities in the wired or wireless MANET.



# Stealing Web Traffic: External Version

NS-3 on one machine, linked to another machine running Kali/loki



codename\_loki

MPLS ROUTING HOT-STANDBY icmp6 tcp-md5 wlccp arp dot1q

rip ospf bgp eigrp

Host

Add from file	IP	Mask	Next Hop	Metric
(None)				

Manual Entry

IP  
10.12.64.2

Mask  
255.255.255.255

Next Hop  
10.11.129.20

Metric  
1

[7] Listening on eth0

```
root@kali:~# ps ax |grep apache
7987 ?    Ss   0:00 /usr/sbin/apache2 -k start
7989 ?    S    0:00 /usr/sbin/apache2 -k start
7990 ?    S    0:00 /usr/sbin/apache2 -k start
7991 ?    S    0:00 /usr/sbin/apache2 -k start
7992 ?    S    0:00 /usr/sbin/apache2 -k start
7993 ?    S    0:00 /usr/sbin/apache2 -k start
7994 ?    S    0:00 /usr/sbin/apache2 -k start
8065 ?    S    0:00 /usr/sbin/apache2 -k start
8311 ?    S    0:00 /usr/sbin/apache2 -k start
8312 ?    S    0:00 /usr/sbin/apache2 -k start
8425 pts/0  S+   0:00 grep apache
root@kali:~#
```

